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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is intended to provide a global perspective 
on a global issue: the protection of radioactive sources 
from theft from the premises where they are normally 
kept, or from sabotage in situ or from their malicious 
use at some other location that meets the objectives of 
an adversary. It is not a commentary on the situation in 
any single State; it is more an attempt to describe what 
the term “radioactive source security” means and to high-
light the fact that relatively few States have taken action 
to provide what I would argue is adequate security for 
these items. 
Since the terrible events of 11 September 2001, the 
prospect of potential “dirty bombs” has been looming 
over society. Dirty bombs are a signiicant threat because 
although they are relatively simple to create and transport, 
the consequences of their deployment (clean-up of con-
tamination, denial of use of the affected area etc) create 
strong propaganda images that engender the fear that gives 
the adversary political inluence. In addition, recovery costs 
are disproportionately large compared to the value and 
technological level of the weaponry involved (1).
Some governments see their nations as “target States” 
so they are more concerned about these issues than others. 
As a result, they have put in place a series of security 
measures to protect radioactive sources from theft and 
misuse as weapons. But in Europe the number of States 
that have taken these steps is actually very low, perhaps 
only 20 per cent of the total number of States in the Eu-
ropean Union (2).
Obtaining the data from which this conclusion was 
made was not straightforward, and it has proved even 
more dificult to obtain it for the wider world. Profes-
sional judgement (based on business intelligence gleaned 
from international meetings, journals and electronic media) 
suggests that if anything, the proportion of States who 
have taken positive steps to secure radioactive sources is 
even lower in other continents than in Europe. This raises 
the question: why? That is, why have not more States 
taken precautions to minimise the probability of a suc-
cessful diversion of a radioactive source to malicious uses? 
This question is discussed in this paper.
1.1  The Meaning of the Term “Security of Radioactive 
Sources”?
Before going further, it is appropriate to say a word 
about the terms used in this paper. “Safety” and “security” 
have been deined and discussed at some length elsewhere 
(3). A convenient summary (with new emphases) is: 
“Safety is about protecting people from radioactive 
sources; 
 Security is about protecting radioactive sources 
from people.”
To make this even clearer, the following table (Table 1) 
lists some elements of radioactive source security so as 
to show how administrative safety measures shade into 
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clarify the possible threat, the consequent needs and the 
practical implementation of radioactive source security, 
to those for whom it is not familiar.
2.   THE IMPORTANCE OF A GLOBAL PROTECTION 
SYSTEM
There are two complementary strands of thought about 
why radioactive source security matters. The irst strand 
concerns the potential consequences of radioactive ma-
terials by an adversary. It is not proposed to provide a 
summary of the potential consequences of such an attack 
here, but IAEA reports on radiological accident response 
(4,5,6) demonstrate some of the consequences of accidents. 
Such accidents may be used as analogues of deliberate at-
tacks. This is because, although the causes may be differ-
ent, the consequences will be very similar. It is reasona-
ble to expect that deliberate and well thought-through use 
of radioactivity as a weapon will have similar radiological, 
social, psychological and economic consequences. If the 
scenarios in these reports are unfamiliar, it should be em-
phasised that the consequences are very signiicant: a few 
deaths, very many other casualties of differing degrees 
of severity and other long-lasting consequences (including 
disproportionately large recovery costs and radioactive 
tangible security measures including physical protection 
and effective regulation.
The intention of this table is to try to deine what is 
meant by the term “security” in real life practical terms. 
This is necessary because there exists a spectrum of 
measures from the administrative to the use of hardware 
and other recognised security measures and it is essential 
to understand this. It is possible to claim that radioac-
tive source security is in place in a State which has only 
signed up to the IAEA Code of Conduct or created a na-
tional inventory of radioactive sources. These measures 
are worthwhile, but are only a part of the story – they are 
only the irst steps towards establishing an effective and 
comprehensive system to ensure the security of radioactive 
sources.
Table 2 is an attempt to provide an “at a glance” sum-
mary of a more meaningful deinition of the term security, 
in order to help distinguish these things from actions tak-
en for the purposes of safety. The lightly shaded area of 
the body of the table highlights what constitute security 
measures rather than safety measures. It should be noted 
that the intellectual distinction between safety and secu-
rity of radioactive sources is dificult to explain. Simple 
demonstrations like Table 2 that convey the ideas that are 
involved in “security” as distinct from “safety” should 
not be dismissed. Instead, every effort should be made to 
Component Safety Relevant Security Relevant
Sign up to the IAEA CoC √ √
Sign up to the Import/ Export Guidance √ √
Implement a national registry of sources √ √
Undertake a Design Basis Threat Assessment √
Adopt IAEA NSS & especially RS-G-1-9 √
Deine national standards on physical protection √
Implement legislation requiring operators to keep sources secure √
Use trained Inspectors to assess security compliance of operators √
Table 1.  The Distinction between Some Safety Measures Some-times Presented as Security Measures and Some Measures that More 
Convincingly Represent the Effective Implementation of Radioactive Source Security in a State
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nuclear materials. It may be concluded therefore that the 
overall risk from diversion of radioactive materials to ma-
licious uses could be as high as for the nuclear materials 
threat. 
The second strand of thought is based on the concept of 
deterrence. Deterrence theory has been used to examine 
radiological terrorism (7). As a concept, deterrence has 
been applied in criminology and also in military studies. 
Extended deterrence is a military term which describes 
the effect whereby one State deters third party States 
from attacking other allied States. There are points of iner 
detail within deterrence theory that can’t be considered 
here, but the two main forms of deterrence are: punishment 
and denial. 
waste management challenges) that have the potential to 
harm and greatly distress large numbers of people and 
or bring down a government. Despite the sceptical views 
sometimes expressed by those more concerned about nu-
clear weapons of mass destruction, radiological weapons do 
cause mass disruption. Neither are they simply (as some-
times popularly described) weapons of “mass distraction” 
that only cause authorities to take their concentration off 
the nuclear material threat. It can be asserted that radio-
logical weapons are suficiently signiicant, in terms of 
their potential consequences, not to be disregarded. Fur-
thermore, the probability that they are accessible to an 
adversary is so much greater since they are more numer-
ous, less well protected and more widely distributed than 
N
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Main subject Component subjects Detailed composition of components
Commitment to global 
policies on radioactive source 
security
Code of Conduct on Safety 
& Security of Radioactive 
Sources
Guidance on the Import & Export of Radioactive Sources , 
IAEA Documents
Establish & maintain a national inventory of radioactive 
sources
Understanding threat Threat Assessment Design Basis Threat – security services role
Security of regulated 
materials
Physical Protection
Physical Measures – “gates, guards, guns”
Administrative Measures – vetting, access controls
Insider threats - 2 person rule
Information Security
Information about physical protection
Information about T,L,Q,V (*)
Information about modes of malicious use
Security Management
Local Inventory, Security Plan, Security procedures, source 
musters.
Import / Export Controls
 
Import
Export
EURATOM/1493/93 (Europe only; this relates to internal 
movements between EU Member States)
Effective regulation
Deined standards for physical protection; trained inspectors, 
compliance assessments at intervals
Protecting against materials 
outside regulatory control
Orphan Sources Strategy Detection and Interdiction at ports and other borders
Table 2. An Attempt to Describe the Scope of Radioactive Source Security in Terms of Some of its Safety and Security Components
* T,L,Q,V = Type, Location, Quantity and Vulnerability of radioactive sources at a speciic site. The proposition here (and adopted 
in the UK) is that where location information (address, building number etc) is combined with information about the type of mate-
rial (radionuclides) or quantity (activity) or vulnerability of the inventory (due to inadequate or failed security measures), then this 
information is sensitive. In the UK it is now protectively marked as “OFFICIAL” and protected accordingly.
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does not explain why these problems are perceived as in-
surmountable, nor does it help inform us how they might 
be overcome. So instead, it is useful to consider some of 
the things that could be done to overcome inertia at the 
political level. This entails equipping the inluencers of 
national governments with enough information for them 
really to understand the issues: to change their minds so 
that they can in turn, inluence the minds of their political 
superiors. The potential outcome is a greater national 
political awareness of a potential radiological terrorism 
threat, its relevance to all States and the need for political 
support for a global protection system. This is the reason 
for this and other papers (1, 2, 3, 8). 
A guiding principle of implementation of radioactive 
source security should be the recognition that security 
measures are being put into place to enable practitioners 
to use radioactive sources despite the security climate; 
they are not to stop legitimate practitioners from using ra-
dioactive sources because of the security climate. This is 
where the technical challenges lie: to balance the security 
measure that could be used to protect radioactive sources 
from an adversary against the continuing need to be able 
to use them for their justiied beneicial uses.
Consideration has been given elsewhere to technical 
cultural issues that may have caused apathy and delays 
in implementing an effective source security regime in 
most countries. (8). Are there perhaps other reasons that 
can be identiied?
One possibility is that it all appears to be too dificult. 
On encountering for the irst time the idea of protecting 
radioactive sources held in a hospital, university or similar 
institution with high levels of public access and/or high 
staff turnover, the challenge seems to be daunting. How do 
you secure a hospital that may have 100 entrances / exits? 
How do you protect radioactive sources in a university 
that may have 1500+ physical sciences and medical un-
dergraduate and post-graduate students who may need 
to use radiation during their studies? While neither of 
these challenges are easy, they and others are both man-
ageable if they are approached with a prepared mind (9). 
A key step to achieving the correct mindset is to liaise 
with international colleagues who have been through the 
process and learned the lessons about how to overcome 
dificult logistical and management barriers. Good use 
should be made of IAEA, WINS and bilateral relation-
ships to enable sharing of these lessons. It is probably the 
most signiicant factor in solving these problems: being 
able to call on the advice of an experienced practitioner 
in this ield. 
At the time of writing, these are relatively few in 
number. In the 28 countries of the European Union, re-
search suggests that only about six States have imple-
mented a security system for radioactive sources in a way 
that means that they will have really learned how to im-
plement radioactive source security (2). It is likely that 
this proportion is no larger when averaged over all States 
Recognition of deterrence by punishment has its roots 
in 17th century Western philosophy such as Thomas Hob-
bes (1588–1678) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and 
can be summarised by the notion that one of the reasons 
that criminals are jailed is that the consequences of their 
crime exceed the beneits they acquired by committing 
the crime. As a result, they are not so inclined to do it 
again. And others who are aware or witness the punish-
ment are also deterred from repeating the crime.
But we are concerned with deterrence “by denial”. 
Deterrence by denial means persuading the adversary not 
to attack by convincing him that his attack will be de-
feated - that is, that he will not be able to achieve his op-
erational objectives. At the local level, an obviously well 
protected establishment that holds radioactive sources 
will have highly visible security measures. These might 
include: CCTV systems, access control systems, visible 
security staff and obvious physical protection measures 
such as hardened doors and windows. The adversary may 
recognise that these measures are going to be dificult to 
defeat without a signiicant risk of detection and inter-
diction. As a consequence he may be inluenced to try 
another premises where security measures are obviously 
absent, less robust or allowed to fall into disuse. 
The same ideas can be extended to the national level. 
If country A is obviously well protected, then an adver-
sary may turn to country B where there are no security ar-
rangements in place. Denying the adversary the choice of 
radiological weaponry is really only achieved if all States take 
adequate precautions to protect their radioactive sources. 
A global protection system for radiological source securi-
ty is therefore a form of extended deterrence with the aim 
of denying the adversary access to this form of weaponry. 
(Transporting a radioactive source internationally is not 
a dificult challenge, so importing it into a target country 
is a very credible option).
Clearly, denying the use of radioactive sources in a 
“dirty bomb” may result in “encouraging” the adversary 
to use some other (perhaps more conventional) technology 
maliciously. This option may be relatively more accessible 
to the adversary and (crucially from the States’ perspec-
tive), more familiar to the defensive forces of the state 
and hence more manageable. At the least, radiological 
recovery and clean-up will be averted, even if these are 
replaced by other consequences.
3.   REASONS WHY A GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 
HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED
Those who move in the higher orbits of national and 
international politics will argue that the only reason why 
a global protection system has not been achieved is be-
cause of a lack of a political will at the national level. 
Governments do not see a need, or see too many barriers 
to implementing such a system. This may be true, but it 
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by practitioners more than governments or regulatory 
bodies. These provide very clear practical guidance on 
measures that may be used to secure radioactive sources 
(15).
Finally, the third noteworthy organisation is the In-
ternational Radiation Protection Association (“IRPA”). 
IRPA (16) has only recently started its work in this area, 
but it seems likely that within 12 months it will be pro-
viding its own platform to point practitioners to the re-
sources of the IAEA and WINS. (It does not aspire to 
generate its own guidance documents but to assist in the 
dissemination of extant best practice information). But in 
addition, IRPA should be inluential in encouraging the 
development of professionals in this ield. The profes-
sional development of both safety and security special-
ists in the ield of radioactive sources is an important as-
pect of capacity building.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
There is a disappointingly low level of uptake of well 
developed national radioactive source security arrange-
ments in Europe, and very probably around the rest of 
the world. The reasons for this are many, but to simply 
justify this as a “lack of political will at the national level” 
is to ignore the threat and the need to improve this state 
of affairs.
It is constructive to explore the underlying reasons 
for the lack of political will and to try to change this. One 
way is to provide education and support to those who can 
inluence the people who operate at the political level. To 
do this, information and support is required. There are 
signiicant resources available to help in this endeavour, 
including the considerable resources of the IAEA and 
WINS, the support of experienced professionals via IRPA 
and also bilateral support arrangements. 
In the relatively few States that have fully implemented 
radioactive source security, this inertia has been overcome 
and lessons have been learned about how to implement 
a national system of radioactive source security. This 
demonstrates that the challenges can be overcome. But 
actively sharing knowledge and whenever possible shar-
ing experiences, will only improve the global situation.
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